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Abstract
Security in Ambient Intelligence (AmI) poses too many
challenges due to the inherently insecure nature of wire-
less sensor nodes. However, there are two characteristics
of these environments that can be used effectively to pre-
vent, detect, and confine attacks: redundancy and continu-
ous adaptation. In this article we propose a global strat-
egy and a system architecture to cope with security issues
in AmI applications at different levels. Unlike in previous
approaches, we assume an individual wireless node is vul-
nerable.
We present an agent-based architecture with supporting
services that is proven to be adequate to detect and confine
common attacks. Decisions at different levels are supported
by a trust-based framework with good and bad reputation
feedback while maintaining resistance to bad-mouthing at-
tacks. We also propose a set of services that can be used to
handle identification, authentication, and authorization in
intelligent ambients.
The resulting approach takes into account practical is-
sues, such as resource limitation, bandwidth optimization,
and scalability.
Keywords: Ambient intelligence, reputation system, secu-
rity framework for wireless sensor networks.
1. Introduction
In essence, an intelligent environment is a distributed
system that collects data from a wireless sensor network,
processes this data, and enriches the environment with new
meaning. These semantic enhancements can be used by
other applications running on top of our system to make
decisions.
Security concerns are key issues in ambient intelligence
(AmI) since its earliest inception (Weiser, 1993). Many re-
searchers clearly recognize the inherent challenge that an
invisible, intuitive and pervasive system of networked com-
puters holds for current social norms and values concerning
privacy and surveillance. In fact, the increasing attack rate
has become the bottleneck of adopting next-generation ser-
vices and applications. A study from the Computer Security
Institute reveals that a random sample of 223 organizations
had lost hundreds of millions of dollars in 2002 due to se-
curity attacks [1].
For example, Brumley and Boneh [7] developed a tim-
ing attack for the OpenSSL implementation of RSA in a
real TCP/IP network. This low-cost attack exploits some
asymmetries introduced by two optimizations used in the
OpenSSL implementation. Even in OpenSSL, that is con-
sidered to be quite reliable and secure, and it is used in many
servers around the world, it is possible to find asymmetries
that reveal some data of the cryptographic keys. And these
asymmetries can be used to implement a real attack. Using
OpenSSL or something equivalent for sensor communica-
tions would be impractical in most cases, and therefore the
security threats become much worse as many more attack
opportunities arise.
Three factors contribute to make security in intelligent
environments a very difficult problem: 1) many nodes in the
network have very limited resources; 2) pervasiveness im-
plies that some nodes will be in non-controlled areas and are
accessible to potential intruders; 3) all these computers are
globally interconnected, allowing attacks to be propagated
step by step from the more resource-constrained devices to
the more secure servers with lots of private data.
Usually, security issues are addressed, in a similar way
to services in a network of general-purpose computers, by
adding an authentication system and encrypted communi-
cations. First, the resource limitations make the embedded
computers especially vulnerable to common attacks.
In previous work [18], we demostrated that current ci-
phers and countermeasures often imply more resources
(more computation requirements, more power consump-
tion, specific integrated circuits with careful physical de-
sign, etc.), but usually this is not affordable for this kind
of applications. But even if we impose strong requirements
for any individual node to be connected to our network, it is
virtually impossible to update hardware and software when-
ever a security flaw is found. It has already been stressed
the need to consider security as a new dimension during the
whole design process of embedded systems [16, 22], and
there are some initial efforts towards design methodologies
to support security [2, 5, 23], but to the best of our knowl-
edge no attempt has been made to exploit the special char-
acteristics of AmI environments.
AmI applications have to live with the fact that privacy
and integrity can not be preserved in every node of the net-
work. This poses restrictions on the information a single
node can manage, and also in the way the applications are
designed and distributed in the network.
Of course, the inherent insecurity of embedded systems
should not lead us to not try hard to avoid compromises.
We should guarantee that a massive attack can not be fast
enough to avoid the detection and recovery measures to be
effective. Therefore we should design the nodes as secure
as the available resources allow.
In spite of the disadvantages of AmI environments from
the security point of view, they provide two advantages for
fighting against attacks:
• Redundancy. AmI environments usually have a
high degree of spatial redundancy (many sensors that
should provide coherent data), and temporal redun-
dancy (habits, periodic behaviors, causal dependen-
cies), and both can be used to detect and isolate faulty
or compromised nodes in a very effective manner.
• Continuous adaptation. AmI environments are evolv-
ing continuously, there are continuous changes of
functional requirements (data requests, service re-
quests, user commands...), nodes appear and disappear
continuously and therefore routing schemes change,
low batteries force some functionality to be migrated
to other nodes, etc.
In this article we propose a more secure approach to the
design of AmI applications by exploiting these two proper-
ties. Section 2 describes our approach in detail. In section 3
we review some relevant attacks, the countermeasures that
have been proposed previously, the requirements that these
threats impose to our design strategy and demonstrates how
this approach can detect and confine them. In section 4, we
draw some conclusions.
2. AMISEC architecture
2.1 Overview
We focus on the development of secure applications in
future wireless sensor networks, where many sensors pro-
vide data about observable magnitudes from the environ-
ment, and many actuators let the system act on the state of
the environment.
Following the Ackoff taxonomy for the content of the
human mind, we classify the content of the “ambient mind”
into four categories:
1. Data: Symbols. It simply exists and has no signifi-
cance beyond its existence (in and of itself).
2. Information: Data that is processed to be useful; pro-
vides answers to “who”, “what”, “where”, and “when”
questions.
3. Knowledge: Application of data and information; an-
swers “how” questions.
4. Intelligence1: Appreciation of “why”. It is the process
by which new knowledge is synthesized from the pre-
viously held knowledge.
The main characteristic of an intelligent ambient is the
semantic enrichment of environment based on the process-
ing of data obtained from the environment using a sensor
network. This “ambient mind” enhances the semantics of
the environment by adding meaning to the objects. The ob-
jects are conscious of the “who”, “what”, “where”, “when”,
“how”, and “why”.
Data is obtained by sensor nodes, but as they are not
trusted, most of the remaining processing should be done
in secure servers so that confidentiality attacks do not suc-
ceed (note that data has no meaning by itself). Data is sent
to servers where it is processed to generate information,
and then knowledge, and then understanding, and then new
meaning, which is returned back to the environment. Indi-
vidual nodes may be insecure, but the system should always
continue its function of semantic enhancement. Moreover,
attacks of individual nodes should not affect the decisions
based on data from the environment. These requirements
are achieved by perusing redundancy to discard data from
the compromised nodes, and by changing the network struc-
ture and behavior at a speed that is fast enough to prevent a
chained attack to spread.
Figure 1 shows the data flow in the environment. As
confidentiality attacks become more dangerous as data is
further processed, there should be little or no processing at
all in the sensor nodes, which are more vulnerable.
1Actually, this category comprises two from the Ackoff taxonomy: un-
derstanding and wisdom.
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Figure 1. Overview of the data processing
flow in the AMISEC environment and the se-
curity measures.
2.2 Network model
We consider the network composed by two kinds of
nodes: wireless nodes and servers.
• Wireless nodes. They provide data to the network to
enable decisions to be made. In our model, decisions
are made primarily in secure servers, and therefore the
main task of these wireless nodes is sending data to
the servers. The more data is sent to the servers, the
more redundancy can be used to discard bad data and
to detect failures or intrusions. But also, the more
data is sent, the more bandwidth is used and the more
energy is consumed, so we have to reach a compro-
mise. There are many wireless nodes in an intelligent
ambient, so they have to be inexpensive, what usu-
ally means very limited resources, battery-powered,
not maintained and hence insecure; an intruder may
have physical access to them.
• Servers. They receive data from sensors and make de-
cisions in order to reach the applications objectives.
These decisions may imply to act in the environment
and therefore they have to be secure. Servers are
usually well maintained, wire-connected and their re-
sources are not usually constrained at all.
In order to improve network scalability and throughput,
we use a clustering technique based on Random Competi-
tion based Clustering (RCC) [28] to construct a multi-level
network structures. Previous approaches [3, 4, 17] group
nodes into clusters, and within each cluster a node is elected
as a cluster head. Cluster heads together form a higher-level
network, upon which clustering can again be applied. This
structure simplifies communication and makes it possible to
restrict bandwidth-consuming network attacks like flooding
to a single cluster.
For a wireless network with n nodes capable of transmit-
ting at Wbits/s, according to [13], the throughput, T , for
each node under optimal conditions is
T = Θ
(
W√
n
)
Thanks to the clustering approach, in a two-level mobile
backbone network where the number of nodes is n and the
number of clusters is m, the throughput in the lower level
becomes
T1 = Θ
(
W1√
n/m
)
and in the higher level
T2 = Θ
(
W2√
m
)
Node clustering, however, reduces redundancy and intro-
duces single points of failure, as an intruder could control a
whole zone by attacking its cluster head. The solution we
propose is to introduce redundancy again. Every node in the
network will have several cluster heads and will distribute
messages randomly between them. This additional redun-
dancy does not reduce the maximum throughput because at
any given time the network structure is exactly the same as
in the pure RCC scheme.
It may be argued that for every node to have two clus-
ter heads, we need to double the backbone nodes so that
there are twice as much backbone nodes in the coverage
area. While it is true that more nodes have to belong to
the backbone, this does not imply any reduction of the at-
tainable throughput, as at any given time half the backbone
nodes will not be used as such, and therefore the network
structure remains exactly the same as in the pure RCC case.
On the contrary, the burden of routing backbone messages
is more distributed and therefore the penalty in energy con-
sumption of being a cluster head is significantly reduced.
2.3 Assumptions
We assume that servers are secure and reliable.
The number of wireless nodes is assumed to be huge
compared to the number of servers.
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Due to being physically accessible and resource-
constrained, wireless nodes are considered to be vulnera-
ble. We assume an intruder can seize control of any wireless
node in a minimum time ta.
There is a working service location system in the net-
work, and it is secure and reliable. This article will not
address the problems of deployment and operation of this
service. We assume that every node in the network knows
how to reach any particular service.
As redundancy is good to detect and isolate attacks, any
device providing useful information should be welcomed.
Therefore, we assume that new wireless nodes can be added
dynamically to our network without any restriction. Our
architecture should assure that a continuous addition of bad
nodes will not affect to the global behavior.
2.4 System architecture
The AMISEC approach to the previously described
threats is based on leveraging the two weapons that we have
to detect and resist to attacks and failures: redundancy (spa-
tial and temporal), and continuous adaptation. Also, we
know that individual wireless nodes are vulnerable to at-
tacks, and therefore no important decision should be made
by a single node and no significant information should be
stored in a single node.
We propose a software architecture based on many inde-
pendent agents with simple and clear responsibilities. The
term agent is heavily overloaded and should be defined
more precisely. An AMISEC agent is an independent piece
of software that is able to act on your behalf while you
are doing other things (they are proactive), and it does this
based on its knowledge of your preferences and the context.
This knowledge is stored in servers and it is available to the
network nodes through the use of passive services.
Figure 2 shows the main AMISEC components. As can
be seen, there is no direct communication between sensors
and actuators, in order to avoid an intruder to modify the
state of the environment while not preventing the free addi-
tion of sensor nodes to the system.
Individual sensor nodes are not trusted by default, and
therefore the notion of trust is built dynamically by com-
paring a sensor with its neighbourhood. For this reason, ev-
ery agent that needs to take into account data coming from
sensor nodes or any derived information uses a trust-based
decision framework that is further described below.
2.4.1 Trust-based decision framework
We follow the definitions and beliefs of Boukerch et al.
in [6] concerning the distinction between trust and reputa-
tion.
Trust is the degree of belief about the future behavior
of other entities. Trust is subjective and it is based on past
experiences.
Reputation, on the other hand, is the global perception of
an entity’s behavior, and it is based on the trust that others
hold on that entity. It is mostly objective and it has some
influence in the evolution of trust in every node.
To consider a data item to be valid we use two consis-
tency tests. The data item is said to be s-consistent or con-
sistent with the spatial redundancy if it is consistent with the
data provided by the majority of sensors that provide mea-
surements of the same variable. For example, for a presence
event from a PIR detector to be valid, the majority of nodes
monitoring the same area should also detect presence. In
this evaluation every sensor is weighted with the trust value
the receiving node has about the source node.
A second way to discard bad data is to evaluate each data
item against temporal data redundancy. Each routing ele-
ment stores a limited set of previous values for each variable
directly routed through itself. The data item is said to be t-
consistent if the variation against previous data is normal for
that variable. For example, if a temperature value changes
drastically and it is not maintained during some time, maybe
a routing element has been attacked.
Both properties, s-consistency and t-consistency, are de-
pendent on the variable being measured.
To model trust and reputation in our agent system, every
node in the network maintains a trust table with entries for
every relevant neighbor node.
When a new node is discovered, the initial trust value is
0.
Whenever a new message containing a new measurement
of the external variable v arrives, trust on node i is recalcu-
lated as follows.
dv(t) = Av({τi(t− 1), dvi(t)})
τi(t) = T (τi(t− 1), dv(t), Hvi)
Hvi represents all the data values of the variable v pro-
vided by node i that are stored in this node (history is
usually truncated to reduce memory requirements). Av is
an aggregation function that depends on the variable being
measured, and it does not take into account data coming
from a node with negative or zero trust value. T is also an
aggregation function with these properties:
• If τi(t−1) is negative, the data item is discarded and no
further processing is done for this message (repeated
inconsistencies may lead to negative values of trust).
• If the new data element dvi(t) is s-inconsistent and t-
inconsistent, it is stored in the local history (discarding
the oldest value), but it is not taken into account for
trust recalculation.
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Figure 2. Main AMISEC components.
• If it is s-inconsistent with other sensors’ data but t-
consistent with previous values of the same sensor,
trust on sensor i decreases.
• If it is s-consistent and t-consistent and current trust is
positive, trust increases.
As can be seen, trust computation condenses historical
information, and therefore it is bad, as we lose redundancy.
On the other hand, resources are tightly constrained and we
have to reduce storage requirements to a minimum.
To avoid some attacks, temporal disappearance means
loss of positive trust (not negative). Whenever it appears
again, it will get a 0 trust value.
There is a second method to feed trust values back from
redundancy analysis: reputation messages from the servers.
From time to time, nodes communicate their trust tables
to the servers. This is done at the routing level by adding
this trust information to messages that are being sent to the
same destination. Servers are not resource constrained by
assumption, and therefore they can store all the historical
information for future analysis. The adequate combination
of all the trust data of a zone generates the global reputation
data:
ρvi(t) = R(ρvi(t− 1), Hvi)
Where Hvi represents all the history of data values of
the variable v provided by sensor i, and R is another ag-
gregation function. Well-behaved nodes increase their rep-
utation; bad-behaved ones decrease their reputation. Mul-
tiple agents can be running on the trust servers to look for
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attack evidences in the message history, and proactively re-
duce reputation values of suspect nodes.
Whenever a server decides that it has to act in the en-
vironment by modifying trust values for ill-behaved nodes,
it broadcasts the reputation information of all the nodes in
that zone. This message is repeated from time to time until
the data the server receives from that zone is consistent with
the global reputation information.
A wireless node will never take into account this reputa-
tion information unless it has been received from different
routers (cluster heads). Thus, redundancy in routing paths
and trust merging in secure servers allows us to feed good
and bad reputation back to the network without being vul-
nerable to bad mouthing attacks.
The trust data sent to the servers is enough to detect most,
if not all, common attacks. However, it is not enough to find
the concrete faulty or compromised node, and therefore the
servers would not be able to confine the attack. The solution
we propose is to include the routing path in some of the
messages. This way, by analyzing the paths of messages
with t-consistent and s-consistent data it is easy to discard
well-behaved nodes. Note that routing paths coming from a
compromised node could have been faked.
The confinement agents act directly by decreasing the
reputation values of the suspect nodes.
Parameter Description
Redundancy-related
Np Number of reputation tables stored in a
node.
Nd Number of values stored for each sen-
sor/value pair.
Nr Number of routers per node.
Adaptation-related
tτ Time between trust data messages sent to
the reputation servers.
tρ Time between reputation data messages
from the servers to the nodes.
tv Time between sensor data messages from
the sensor nodes to the network.
tr Minimum time between messages con-
taining route information.
Table 1. Parameters that can be adjusted dy-
namically to adapt the environment to possi-
ble attacks.
A number of parameters (see table 1) can be dynami-
cally adjusted in order to adapt the environment to possible
attacks. If the risk increases, we increase the local amount
of redundancy around the affected area.
2.4.2 Sensor agents
Sensor agents are the simplest ones. They usually run on
wireless nodes and provide measured data of external vari-
ables to the network, by sending messages to their routing
agents. The message rate depends on the variation rate of
the variable being monitored. This message rate should be
enough to ensure that data items do not change too fast and
therefore temporal redundancy can be used to detect failures
or attacks.
Each sensor agent is associated to a sensor device and
generates a sequence of measurements dvi(t), dvi(t+ 1), ...
where v is the variable being measured and i is the sensor
agent id. Each data item is annotated with a time stamp, to
detect temporal anomalies.
As previously stated, there is not a single routing agent
for each sensor agent, and this agent decides randomly what
routing agent to use for every message.
Although they do not consume data from other sensors,
they need to maintain a trust table for their routing elements,
that will only evolve with reputation information coming
from the servers. Unlike in routing elements, the initial trust
value for a routing element is positive, and the distribution
of messages is uniform between all the routing nodes with
positive trust.
2.4.3 Actuator agents
Actuator agents operate physically on the environment
(light switches, electronic equipment controls, alarms, etc.).
They are especially critical because 1) they are usually not
redundant, and 2) any operation on them causes a physical
effect on the environment. Therefore the nodes running ac-
tuator agents should be at least as tamper-resistant as the
physical element they control. To ensure that an intruder
can not operate remotely on an actuator, only servers can
send operation requests to these agents and they should use
robust asymmetric encryption algorithms. As security and
processing requirements are higher, these nodes are usually
main powered.
The data flow goes from sensors to servers and from
servers to actuators. There is no feedback from actuators
to servers. So if an actuator is attacked, the assailant will
not be able to access to the others entities in the network.
Logically, an actuator works as a passive service, but it
also develops a trust model of its environment, which is fed
to the servers.
2.4.4 Aggregation agents
Aggregation agents reduce the redundancy by combining
several data items using a known aggregation function. The
only reason to apply these aggregations is to reduce the
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amount of data sent to the servers, allowing the system to
scale.
Trust computation implies also an aggregation of spatial
and temporal redundant data that is held in a node.
2.4.5 Services
Services are passive elements that can be used by other
nodes in the network. They usually run in servers.
Some of the services that have important roles for secu-
rity reasons are: object tracking system, user tracking sys-
tem, user modeling system, and common sense database.
2.5 Identity and authentication
In this kind of environments there are two types of iden-
tity: object identity and user identity.
Objects are every traceable element in the network (a
wireless sensor node, a camera, a remote control device,
etc.). They are freely added to the network and they will
only be isolated by the system in case of bad behavior.
Object identity is handled by the object tracking system,
a server that stores and processes all the location informa-
tion of network objects.
Different agents provide location information about the
objects in the network.
From the security point of view, the main purpose of the
object tracking system is to be able to detect and confine
sybil attacks [?].
Authentication is implicit and linked to the concept of
reputation. When the system has enough consistent data
from an object identity, its reputation will grow and it is
considered to be authenticated.
User identity is handled by the user tracking system.
User identities are logical identifiers that are used to han-
dle permissions in the environment. They are linked to
objects automatically, based on the analysis of the data
coming from the environment, the user model (preferences,
habits, etc), and the common sense (we use a common sense
database based on OpenMind’s).
2.6 Authorization service
As previously seen, actuators have to be more secure be-
cause they can operate on the environment. No agent is
allowed to use directly an actuator. They send an actuation
request to the authorization service, and this service, if the
object is linked to a user identity with permissions and the
action is considered to be secure, will use the actuator. In
our current implementation the authorization service holds
the public keys for every actuator in the system and every
operation message is encrypted with the public key of the
actuator.
2.7 Surveillance agents
Common intrusion detection systems, as well as more
specific analyses can be run in the servers to detect intru-
sions or failures. These systems can confine a detected in-
trusion by changing reputation tables and identity informa-
tion.
2.8 Application-level issues
Information handled by a single wireless node can not be
significant. This poses restrictions on the way the applica-
tions are designed.
3. Evaluation
Nodes of a sensor network need to access, store, manipu-
late and communicate information. In AmI, nodes make de-
cisions based on received data. Therefore, the system must
guarantee data reliability. Some applications will require
the use of sensitive information. In that case, measures to
ensure data confidentiality should be taken into account. In
this section, we will analyze the different kinds of attack
that a sensor network is exposed to.
The next sections classify the different threats attending
to their primary focus.
3.1 Confidentiality attacks
Confidentiality attacks attempt to access to the informa-
tion stored in the sensor network. They can be further clas-
sified attending to the target of the attack:
• Attacks to the confidentiality of communications.
• Attacks to the confidentiality of node information (data
generated in the sensor waiting to be sent to a server,
service information stored in the network, and server
information).
In a closed system with high-resources devices, informa-
tion can be protected using cipher algorithm and physical
access control. However, sensor networks are more vulner-
able due to their characteristics:
1. Nodes have very limited resources.
2. Potential intruders may physically access to them.
3. Wireless communications.
The network can use well-suited cipher algorithms [19]
to provide security against attacks to communications. Due
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to conditions 1 and 2, nodes are more vulnerable to the at-
tacks than communications. Some approaches suggest ci-
phering stored data [24]. Nevertheless, a combination of
logical (cryptography weakness and Trojan horses), and
physical (DPA, SPA, micro-probing, reverse engineering)
attacks could break the ciphering and access the informa-
tion.
Due to the characteristics of the sensor nodes, it is not
possible to secure its data against attacks. Even if we ci-
pher the information in the devices, an attacker could use
an approach based on logical and physical attacks that could
break the ciphering. Since attackers have physical access to
the nodes and nodes have limited resources, confidentiality
should be based in the main characteristics of sensor net-
works: distribution and redundancy.
3.1.1 Attack to the confidentiality of node information
Sensor agents. In this kind of attack, the intruder accesses
to the information stored in a sensor. If the attack suc-
cesses, the attacker will obtain the information stored in it,
but it is only raw data, not significant by itself. In addi-
tion, mapping that information with a concrete user is im-
possible because mapping information is stored in servers
or distributed among a very large number of nodes. While
the number of nodes holding some particular information
remains much higher than the number of attacked nodes,
attackers will not be able to obtain meaningful information.
Actuator agents. These agents do not store other infor-
mation than the status of the physical device they control
and the trust table for its routers.
Aggregation agents. By attacking an aggregation agent
or a node that runs an aggregation agent, an intruder may
gain access to redundant local raw data, but anything else.
Redundant data is useful to discard bad data, but it gives no
extra information.
Decision-making agents. They run in servers, which
are not physically accessible, and have enough resources
to keep the information secure.
3.1.2 Attack to the confidentiality of communications
In this attack, an intruder listens to the channel trying to ob-
tain some information. Due to sensor redundancy and infor-
mation distribution, the attacker should break all communi-
cations between sensors and routers to obtain some signif-
icant information. The use of some ciphering algorithms
will help protecting the system. Since the network is big
enough, an attacker that listens to the channel will obtain
only a set of dvi(t). By definition, that set will not represent
any meaningful information, so the attack will fail.
3.2 Denial of service attacks
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an attempt to inter-
rupt, disrupt, or destroy services and operations in a system,
which includes:
• Jamming, collision and flooding: These attacks con-
sist in interfering in communication by sending mes-
sages through several protocol layers. The immediate
effect of these attacks is the loss of part of the mes-
sages from the nodes of the affected area. The af-
fected area depends on the layer in which it occurs.
The upper the attack occurs on the protocol stack, the
more it spreads. So the scope of these attacks could
be zone or global depending on their dimension and
the layer where they occur (physical, link, or trans-
port layers). Wood and Stankovic [27] explain sev-
eral countermeasures for these attacks: they suggest
confinement, small frames, error-correcting codes and
client puzzles.
• Neglect and greed: This simple form of DoS attack fo-
cus on a router vulnerability by arbitrarily ignoring all
or some messages. It is especially dangerous in envi-
ronments using hierarchical routes and static routing
protocols. A possible solution would be a routing pro-
tocol with several paths available [27].
• Misdirection, blackholes and wormholes: These at-
tacks are very difficult to avoid, detect and confine.
Authorization and monitoring have been proposed to
avoid them. However, it is not possible to deploy a
secure wireless sensor networks based exclusively on
ciphering and authorization. It is necessary to supply
additional techniques to reinforce the system. We will
use redundancy again to detect these attacks. There
exists some countermeasures consisting on enhanced
protocols like [9], however they require too many re-
sources to be used in tiny nodes.
Now, we will show how our system can detect and con-
fine the denial of service attacks.
3.2.1 Jamming, collision and flooding
Whether it is jamming, collision or flooding, the effects in
the network are similar: loss of messages and node dis-
appearance. The seriousness and extension of the attack
depends on the number of nodes, the stack layer where it
takes place and several other parameters. Nevertheless, it
leads some nodes to disappear. As no new value from these
nodes arrives to the routers, as trust tables are sent to the
servers, the global trust service will soon discover that the
latest values coming from these nodes are obsolete and it
will mark them as lost.
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The detection of the attack can be performed when a
group of nodes in the same area disappears suddenly. If a
node with positive reputation disappears temporally its rep-
utation will be decreased. This measure will also affect di-
rectly to the routers in the area. Therefore, a message will
not be sent through an affected router, avoiding the zone.
Flooding attack could be more dangerous if messages are
scattered and the whole network is affected. But if the repu-
tation of a faked node is decreased, its forwarded messages
will not be routed and, therefore, harm will not spread.
3.2.2 Neglect and greed, and blackholes
A router may neglect to route all or some messages, but
every node has two or more routers that are used randomly,
and so eventually the messages will arrive to the destination.
Some of the messages include their own route, and the
servers analyze the routes of consistent messages to find
out the routers which do not route properly. A feedback
of negative reputation for these routers will cause messages
to follow other routes avoiding these malicious routers.
3.2.3 Misdirection and wormholes
Local attacks can get worse if the compromised node stops
routing properly, changes the values notified by some sen-
sors, or teleports messages to other area of the network.
A combined use of localization information (object
tracking system), and route analysis for messages coming
from the same area (redundancy in routing elements will
ensure that not every message will go through the worm-
hole), allows to discover easily the bad routers. There are
some proposals similar to this one, like in [14, 26] where
authors propose a method based on location information of
each node join to identity information in messages or like
in [25] where a statistical process of network data is used to
detect wormholes. AMISEC manages the required data so
both are feasible solutions for our system.
Again, once the malicious routers have been detected, it
is possible to confine the compromised nodes by decreasing
their reputation. If a router has a low reputation it will be
probably not chosen for routing messages. And redundancy
in routing elements ensures that the new reputation table
will eventually arrive to any node in the network.
Trust tables going from the sensor nodes to the servers
and reputation tables coming back from the servers can also
be altered by a compromised node, but redundancy again
allows discarding bad messages.
3.3 Integrity attacks
Integrity attacks try to alter the normal behavior of the
system by modifying the data stored in nodes. Although
DoS attacks can be considered as integrity attacks as ser-
vice interruption is one kind of bad behavior, we prefer to
treat them separately because here the focus is on the data,
instead of the communications.
3.3.1 Tampering and homing
These attacks are very difficult to avoid due to the weakness
of wireless nodes. But these are clear cases of local attacks.
Local or node attacks are not relevant for the AMISEC
model, since redundancy allows losing nodes without any
impact in the behavior. Negative reputation can be used
from the servers in order to confine these attacks.
Even if integrity of individual nodes is difficult to
achieve, the use of redundancy can reduce or eliminate the
impact on the global system.
3.4 Identity attacks
Malicious nodes can pretend to be other nodes in order
to implement one of the attacks mentioned above. We will
consider four different types: clone, thief, mole and sybil.
• The clone attack consists in duplicating an operating
node. Both nodes, simultaneously, communicate with
the same identity.
• In the thief attack, a malicious node steals an oper-
ating node its identity and replaces it in the network.
The malicious node stops original node’s operation
and takes advantage of its reputation and trust levels.
• A mole is a malicious node that behaves as a well-
operating node, with a fabricated identification, to
achieve high levels of trust and reputation. Once in-
side, it can attack the system from a privileged posi-
tion.
• The Sybil attack occurs when a malicious device
presents multiple identities, as if it were multiple
nodes, in order to control a substantial fraction of the
system. This attack reduces the effect of the system’s
redundancy without the need of numerous physical
nodes. The attacks can be performed at any layer of
the protocol stack, but they are more profitable in the
upper layers, like network or application.
The first three attacks are carried out by individual mali-
cious nodes, and they can be considered special cases of the
Sybil attack. The Sybil attack was first introduced in [?].
Newsome [21], Karlof [15] and Zhang [29] make thorough
descriptions of the taxonomy, threats and countermeasures
of identity attacks, focusing on the Sybil attack. We can
find three main types of solutions to the identity attacks: re-
source testing, cryptography and location-based.
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Resource testing solutions assume that devices are lim-
ited in some resource [?]. The solutions consist in testing a
limited resource and checking that each identity has no less
capability than a physical node. The resource tested in wire-
less sensor networks, according to Newsome [21], is the
radio communication capability, considering that a device
can access only to one radio channel at a time. Each iden-
tity has a channel assigned and they must send a message
through it simultaneously. The system detects an identity of
a Sybil attack when it receives no message in its channel.
Accurate synchronization between the monitoring devices
is needed and, if we have more identities than channels, we
can’t perform the test to every identity at the same time, so
the detection rate decreases.
Cryptography schemes base their efficiency in secure
communications, and the different solutions differ in how
to establish the keys: the key agreement process. They can
have a key server with the public key of all nodes, and only
establish a key through the key server. Another scheme uses
the self-enforcing scheme approach, based on asymmetric
cryptography with public key. Efficient implementations of
ECC [] can be used in sensor networks to establish secure
links, but it is not enough to avoid the Sybil attack, because
a malicious device may have more resources than the nor-
mal nodes. The third key agreement mechanism is key pre-
distribution scheme [8,11,12]. In these systems each sensor
has a subset of the system keys and a secure link is estab-
lished between nodes which have at least one key in com-
mon. If a node is compromised, several keys are known
by the malicious device. If more nodes are compromised,
the attackers can obtain a substantial fraction of the system
keys.
Location based solutions [10, 20], check that no identi-
ties are at the same position. The solutions assume that the
sensor nodes are static, but real AmI applications have het-
erogeneous networks, with static and moving nodes. The
accuracy of the location system should be high due to the
high density of sensors inherent to AmI applications.
Clone, thief and mole attacks use only one identity, so
their effect is the same as compromising one sole node. It
is proven, as shown in previous sections, that the system
adapts to individual attacks. If the node’s behavior is con-
sistent with the other nodes, the attack is undetectable, but
the information obtained is not significant. In the clone at-
tack the system can detect that the same identity is being
used in two different locations, so the server would reduce
the reputation of both nodes.
On the other hand, the Sybil attack can be dangerous to
the system because it reduces the effect of the system’s re-
dundancy. Our architecture solves the Sybil attack problem
by reducing its attack rate. When an aggregation agent re-
ceives information from an unknown node, the trust level
default value is zero. This is enough to send data from
this node to the servers to collect behavior history, but not
enough to be taken into account in any decision or aggrega-
tion. If the node behaves correctly, its reputation will grow
eventually, but always at a controlled rate. If many sensors
are appearing in a short time in the same area, the required
time to have positive reputation will increase.
4. Conclusion
Wireless Personal Area Networks are based on many
wireless, low cost, low power, and low resources nodes.
These characteristics and the possibility to access physi-
cally to the node make the nodes highly vulnerable to at-
tacks. Cryptography appears as clearly insufficient to main-
tain data confidentiality and integrity in the network.
We have proposed a holistic solution that assumes this
node vulnerability to address security issues in an intelligent
ambient based on massive wireless sensor networks.
Redundancy and fast continuous adaptation have been
identified as the key weapons to defend the system against
attacks, and they are used consistently to cope with security
issues at different levels.
The AMISEC architecture is based on an agent system
with supporting services. Data flows from the sensors to
the servers, where it is processed returning relevant seman-
tic enhancements back to the environment. Agents running
in insecure wireless nodes never hold a significant informa-
tion unit, what preserves global confidentiality, and deci-
sions are made in servers, what preserves integrity if redun-
dancy is used adequately.
Most attacks are detected by the analysis of the redun-
dant data available in the network and collected in the
servers.
Decisions at different levels are supported by a trust-
based framework where trust data only flows from the sen-
sors to the servers and reputation only from the servers to
the sensors.
The resulting approach takes into account practical is-
sues, such as resource limitation, bandwidth optimization,
and scalability.
Based on these results we claim that our approach pro-
vides a practical solution for developing secure AmI appli-
cations.
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